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The aim of this paper is to analyze Rawls’s conception of 
political (public) culture, exploring whether his principle of 
tolerance (Political Liberalism) falls in moral relativism. The 
analysis consists of three sections. Firstly, the author introduces 
different critical accounts on Rawls’s theory and identifies 
where they go wrong. Secondly, the author delineates the 
intellectual tradition of social liberalism from which sprang 
Rawls’s conception, showing that he significantly alters the 
key ideas of dominant liberal justice of the Western world. In 
the final section of the paper it is argued that Rawls’s idea of 
political culture is a cornerstone of just society and the spring of 
tolerance, providing arguments in favor of the idea that Rawls’s 
conception of political liberalism is not morally relativistic but 
it is, however, in line with liberal pluralism.1 
1 This text is a part of the project no. 47026, which is supported by the 
Ministry of Education – Republic of Serbia. The text was first presented 
at conference “Citizens, Societies and Legal Systems: Law and Society 
in Central and South Eastern Europe” at the University of Belgrade – 
Faculty of Law (20 – 21. 11. 2014) under the title “Does Citizenship Entail 
“Metaphysical” Laws?”. I am very grateful for the comments that I received 
at the conference which helped me to refine my initial arguments.
FROM METAPHYSICAL TO POLITICAL:
Does political culture make Rawls’s principle of tolerance morally relativistic?
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INTRODUCTION: IS THERE A 
UNIVERSAL JUSTICE IN PARTICULAR 
POLITICAL CULTURES?
In his later writings, John Rawls (1985; 
1996) argued that justice, as fairness should 
be a political and not a metaphysical con-
ception of a stable society.2 This asser-
tion can be prima facie interpreted as an 
appeal to political philosophy to turn away 
from conceptions of justice that draw jus-
tifications from a universal principle and 
accept the notion of justice being the mat-
ter of what actual people find to be fair in 
their own society. One of the premises from 
which Rawls infers his thesis is that politi-
cal conception of justice is possible only in 
a society in which there is a certain type of 
public political culture: “Justice as fairness 
is a political conception in part because it 
starts from within a certain political tradi-
tion” (Rawls, 1985: 225). The premise is con-
tingent and historical, partly because Rawls 
(1985: 230) calls for the political culture of 
constitutional democracies, whose roots 
stretch to the religious wars at the time of 
the Reformation. The principle of tolerance 
as the political basis of a free society sprang 
from religious conflicts, which consisted of 
incommensurable and irreconcilable meta-
physical worldviews.
Rawls’s idea is well known among liberal 
pluralists. As Berlin (2002: 244) points out: 
“From sheer differences and disagreements 
sprang toleration, variety, humanity.” That 
2 This text is a part of the project no. 47026, which 
is supported by the Ministry of Education – Republic 
of Serbia. The text was first presented at conference 
“Citizens, Societies and Legal Systems: Law and 
Society in Central and South Eastern Europe” at 
the University of Belgrade – Faculty of Law (20 – 21. 
11. 2014) under the title “Does Citizenship Entail 
“Metaphysical” Laws?”. I am very grateful for the com-
ments that I received at the conference which helped 
me to refine my initial arguments. 
does not mean that this is a priori justifi-
able standpoint in the discourse of political 
philosophy. In the traditional semantics of 
political philosophy, the claim that citizen-
ship relies on political, and not metaphysi-
cal principles, means that citizens have no 
obligation to make the ends of their pub-
lic action good, and that such action is not 
based on teleological principles. Instead, 
Rawls’s later works celebrate the diversi-
ty that is generated by “the fact that the 
free development of moral and intellectual 
abilities leads to incommensurable differ-
ences” (Pavicevic, 2011: 210). To claim that 
the stability of institutions is dependent 
on political and not metaphysical concep-
tions implies advocating that the consti-
tution and the laws of a society are to be 
“value neutral” institutions in guarding the 
public good. Both citizens and institutions 
are devoid of normative content, and are 
reduced to the neutral approach: the pri-
mary obligation is to be tolerant in a soci-
ety that nurtures diverse political ends by 
default. Rawls famously describes this soci-
etal state as political liberalism.
Is Rawls’s conception of political liberal-
ism justifiable? If a politician wanted to use 
his thesis on public culture as the founda-
tion of a stable and just society, he/she could 
hardly justify such a position. What the pol-
itician would in fact suggest to the citizens 
when they find themselves in a public space, 
is that they should subject religious, tradi-
tional and other values that matter to them, 
to something that could be termed as polit-
ical agreement on the peaceful and tolerant 
cooperation in a community of conflict-
ing values, even if this agreement results in 
abandoning their metaphysical conceptions 
of good life. It seems that in Rawls’s concep-
tion of political liberalism, laws and institu-
tions acquire their legitimacy through the 
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process of formalization of a political con-
sensus, which excludes the metaphysical 
notion of the public good. In other words, 
the public good is separated from politics 
and political consensus. 
This paper analyzes Rawls’s concep-
tion of a political (public) culture, aiming 
to answer the question as to whether his 
account falls in moral relativism. I ana-
lyze this problem in three sections. First-
ly, I introduce different critical accounts on 
Rawls’s theory and identify where do they 
go wrong. Secondly, I delineate the intel-
lectual tradition of social liberalism from 
which Rawls’s conception sprang, show-
ing that he significantly alters the key ideas 
of dominant liberal justice of the Western 
world. In the final section of the paper I dis-
cuss Rawls’s idea of public culture as a cor-
nerstone of a just society, showing that this 
idea is not doomed for being morally rel-
ativistic but instead, is in line with liberal 
pluralism. 
IS A PRINCIPLE OF TOLERANCE A SAFE 
WAY TO BE A MORAL RELATIVIST?
What is a conception of “political”? 
Rawls does not give a clear answer to this 
question. It is however clear that Rawls des-
ignates something as “political” when it is 
opposite to “metaphysical”. Jean Hampton 
further elaborates this tautology and offers 
an intriguing interpretation (1989: 794) of 
Rawls that identifies the usage of both terms 
in the Hobbesian sense. Hampton believes 
that Rawls’s use of the term “political” is 
such that it allows overlapping and conflict-
ing values to be included into the discussion. 
This argument is based on the standard 
interpretation of a Hobbesian “natural state” 
situation as a dominion of unlimited desires 
of different persons contrasted to scarce 
actual recourses that “will inevitably come 
to desire and try to appropriate the same 
object” (Hampton, 1995: 59). Hampton fur-
ther argues that the use of the term “polit-
ical” is as equally Hobbesian as the term 
“metaphysical”: only in the pre-contractual 
phase (i.e. natural state) does the “political” 
acknowledge the pluralism of individual 
ends of people, who are willing to neglect 
those, not because they believe in the value 
of civil life, but because it is a part of their 
personal interest. Hampton (1989: 807) con-
cludes that in a society constituted by the 
consensus on the basic values, where the 
role of institutions and laws is to guarantee 
the principle of neutrality and regulate the 
conflicting values of moral agents, citizens 
are neither politically nor morally obliged 
to consider such order intrinsically valuable. 
Therefore, Hampton criticizes Rawls’s con-
ception of the political as being reducible to 
egoistic interests of the individuals.  
Hampton (1989: 800) arrives at such con-
sequences because she supposes that there 
is an equivalence between what can best be 
put into two following assertion: 
(1) “Rawls uses the political as 
non-metaphysical” 
(2) “Rawls uses metaphysical as 
non-political” 
This equivalence is however, a false one. 
One cannot apply a Hobbesian strategy of 
reducing social ends to individual inter-
ests to the first assertion since such claim 
would be absurd. Let us suppose the oppo-
site assertion of (1) being true, i.e. “Rawls 
uses the political as metaphysical.” This is 
then a contrapositive of assertion (1). If in a 
Hobbesian strategy one argues that the con-
trapositive of the assertion (2) is impossible 
(i.e. it is unconceivable that metaphysical is 
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political), while the assertion (1) is true, then 
Hampton found that this contrapositive 
is possible and made the whole argument 
absurd. Therefore, there is no equivalence 
between these two assertions because the 
first one is not Hobbesian, while the second 
one is. Rawls argued for the content of the 
first assertion and Hampton wrongly sup-
posed that he also argued for the content of 
the second one.
The fear that Rawls’s use of the term 
political will lead to a Hobbesian social 
situation can be safely discarded. Is there 
some other way to approach the idea that 
the term “political” is “non-metaphysical”? 
According to Boucher and Vincent (2000: 
30) Rawls relates the political to values such 
as tolerance, rationality and reason, while 
the metaphysical is related to the moral 
good, the search for truth and the teleologi-
cal basis of social roles. The important char-
acteristic of the metaphysical, according to 
Rawls’s use of that term (1985: 225), is that 
it is incommensurable. The political, on the 
other hand, brakes the category of incom-
mensurability and finds new grounds in the 
principle of tolerance. This means that the 
theory of political liberalism needs to take 
into account that there is a permanent value 
conflict in a society (value pluralism). The 
quest of a political philosopher is to find a 
neutral solution when it comes to conflict-
ing metaphysical conceptions. The neutral 
solution is a value in itself because it solves 
the problem of conflicting worldviews. 
Rawls refers to this solution as “political”. 
This notion of political, conceptual-
ized in Political liberalism, hasn’t been fully 
accepted in contemporary political philoso-
phy. There are a host of criticisms of Rawls’s 
formal approach to the role of the political 
in a conflicting society, but the best sum-
mary can be found in the following lines 
by Cheshire Calhoun (Vranic, 2016:724): 
“In ethics, for example, moral knowledge 
has become equated with the elaboration 
of highly formalized and stylized deci-
sion procedures, with extremely gener-
al ‘first principles,’ and with manipulating 
the logical implications of hypothetical 
cases whose occurrence in daily life is either 
impossible or improbable. The result is the 
production of a kind of knowledge that has 
no valence, that does not speak to human 
needs, fears, and aspirations, and thus can-
not attract the assent of the biographical 
self, but only a kind of purely logical assent. 
The further result may be, as Annette Baier 
claims, that the morality endorsed by many 
moral theorists ‘is seriously endorsed only 
in their studies, not in the moral education 
they give their children, nor in their reflec-
tive attitude to their own past moral educa-
tion, nor even in their attitude to how they 
teach their own courses in moral philoso-
phy’.” Put differently, the Rawlsian account 
of a fair society relies on a principle of polit-
ical tolerance that no one in real life is likely 
to use or feel the need to follow. The alterna-
tive then is, or at least seems to be, a moral 
relativism in which the scope of tolerance 
is determined by cultural roots and norms. 
Rawls tries to overcome the problem of 
cultural determinism by arguing that when 
the principle of tolerance is applied in a 
society it will lead to a democratic society, 
regardless of different cultural traditions in 
which it is applied to. From Rawls’s account, 
it can be derived that the normative has no 
moral, but a logical meaning, which makes 
sense only when behavior with real con-
sequences can be related to it. If the con-
tent of law is related to tolerance, respect 
for human rights, etc., the political conse-
quence of such content is the establishment 
of a democratic regime. 
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This conception of normative has value 
neutrality in its basis. Rawls’s works in the 
late XX century are closely connected to 
the great dispute that was the axis of almost 
every social science book and conference 
after the World War. In the mid-twentieth 
century, value neutral ideas were severely 
criticized by traditionally oriented political 
philosophers. The criticism was not direct-
ed toward the fact that most value neutral 
social philosophers advocated for democ-
racy, but toward the fact that they did not 
defend it; in other words, their philosophi-
cal relativism gave the impression that they 
were indifferent toward totalitarian ideol-
ogies. Leo Strauss, the well-known expo-
nent of this standpoint, strongly attacked 
the idea of value neutrality in political and 
legal philosophy. For Strauss (1988: 18), the 
basic problem of value neutrality (which 
he also refers to as legal positivism) is that 
it treats the state, laws and institutions as 
instruments and not civilizational goals. 
According to Strauss, law should involve a 
moral obligation that citizens should act in 
the way that preserves the order as intrin-
sic value. When such an obligation is absent, 
the idea of intrinsic value is erased from 
the citizens’ worldview, and replaced with a 
set of rules and regulations, which lead to 
nitpicking and conformism. The positivist 
credo that experience, and not reasons, is 
sufficient for impartial judgment makes the 
whole doctrine morally imperfect (Strauss 
1988: 19). To put it briefly, in Strauss’s view, 
positivism is a doctrine according to which 
“anything goes”, which causes the imaginary 
impartial judge to adopt a behavior which 
leads to value relativism.
The conflict between neutralists and nor-
mativists is primarily concerned with the 
problem of justification of value in social 
life.  While normativists believe that this is 
the only goal of political philosophers, neu-
tralists, according to Arnold Brecht (1947), 
mostly provide argumentation that values 
are a part of an affective behavior of citi-
zens and there is no rational justification for 
establishing them as a norm. Consequently, 
the law should not be concerned with ques-
tions citizens believe to be valuable. The law 
therefore becomes a mere formality, devoid 
of all metaphysical qua value content.
In the revised edition of his influential 
book Politics and Vision, Sheldon Wolin 
concludes that Rawls’s idea of a neutral 
political approach does not start from “the 
virtuous citizen, but the rational self-in-
terested bargainer familiar to economic 
theories” (Wolin, 2004: 531). Wolin’s crit-
icism of Rawls is similar to Strauss’s more 
general criticism of value relativism: with-
out the metaphysical idea of public good, 
there is a threat of double reduction, social 
and legal. The first one refers to the mutu-
al cooperation of citizens, which is basically 
interest-driven action, without the duty to 
respect the fellow citizen. In Wolin’s view 
(2004: 535) the consequence of that reduc-
tion is the partial argumentation toward a 
political culture of capitalism, followed by 
“the devaluation of political values”. The 
latter reduces laws to conventions on valid 
behavior, whose justification is at best triv-
ial (because it is derived from other formal 
norms). 
On the other side, new Rawlsian ideas 
also sparked controversy in the pro-Rawl-
sian school of thought. Aside from her cri-
tique of Rawls’s usage of terms “political” 
and “metaphysics”, Jean Hampton (1989: 
792) is also doubtful about the success of his 
idea of political neutrality, despite her “fas-
cination with and partial endorsement of 
Rawls’s proposal”. More precisely, her key 
question is whether Rawls’s system would 
14
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really make the social consensus intrin-
sically valuable, i.e. whether it would be 
more than a modus vivendi (Hampton 1989: 
800). If Rawls’s ideas were reduced to modus 
vivendi liberalism, such order would fail to 
“affirm the value content which would make 
citizens interested in the preservation of the 
order” (Pavicevic, 2011: 238). Jean Hamp-
ton (1989: 807) expressed a skepticism that 
citizens would believe in the value of active 
politics, if there were no metaphysical crite-
rion they could use to determine the value. 
Hampton then emphasized the role of polit-
ical philosophers as citizens who should be 
more active than others: “Politicians, after 
all, only want acceptance of ideas they (for 
whatever reason) are pushing; philosophers 
are supposed to want the truth” (Hampton, 
1989: 807). In other words, if a political phi-
losopher should be neutral, i.e. if she or he 
cannot determine which of the conflicting 
metaphysical statements is true and valid, it 
seems that there is no criterion which would 
help citizens understand that the consen-
sus is intrinsically valuable, rather than a 
matter of mere interest. Therefore, accord-
ing to Hampton, Rawls needs to enable at 
least some citizens, namely political philos-
ophers, to be obliged to tell the truth and 
judge what is valuable (Hampton 1989: 811). 
It follows that the metaphysical conception 
of justice is possible and necessary, because 
it is one thing to be tolerant toward some-
body who has wrong views, whereas “tol-
erance of ideas themselves is quite another” 
(Hampton, 1989: 811). If Hampton aimed 
to frame Rawls’s account in Plato’s idea of 
civic education for the philosopher king, 
her argument is more than convincing. 
SELF-IMPROVEMENT AND THE 
POLITICAL: CONTESTED NATURE OF 
SOCIAL LIBERALISM
The reason why Rawls’s use of the polit-
ical can be brought into question by means 
of its opposite (the metaphysical), is the 
fact that political liberalism is essentially 
contested. It is uncertain whether the state 
should have a neutral, i.e. procedural role 
when it comes to solving social conflicts, 
or whether it should strive to ensure public 
good and public virtue. In the tradition of 
contemporary liberal thought, it seems that 
the latter position is dominant: “Contem-
porary theory of citizenship and political 
culture clearly indicates that procedural-in-
stitutional mechanisms are not powerful 
enough to limit the aggression of particu-
lar interests […] Shortly, a certain level of 
public virtue and ‘public wisdom’ is neces-
sary in order for a political order to function 
well” (Podunavac, 2008: 163).
Although Rawls’s modifications are sig-
nificant, one cannot eschew the impression 
that the basis of his version of political lib-
eralism is related to the tradition of social 
liberalism. Boucher and Vincent (2000) 
explored the idea of citizenship in social lib-
eralism, by comparing the conceptions of T. 
H. Green and John Rawls. The research done 
by these authors showed that Green’s social 
liberalism sprang from the need of liberals 
to eliminate the influence of classical util-
itarianism and turn toward Mill’s concep-
tion of liberalism (Boucher and Vincent, 
2000). In this sense, it seems that Green and 
Rawls have the same opponent. The impor-
tant difference, according to Boucher and 
Vincent (2000: 29), is that Green’s citizens 
are gathered around the idea of commu-
nity as space for individual self-perfection. 
One of the basic duties of citizens is that 
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in their action toward public good they 
should demonstrate “active moral reflective 
engagement” (Boucher and Vincent, 2000: 
33). In other words, a good citizen is a “met-
aphysical” citizen. 
What makes the thesis of political liber-
alism essentially contested is the fact that 
Green and Rawls start from the same prob-
lem (classical utilitarianism) and the same 
premises when it comes to the examination 
of political obligation as the basis of stabile 
order. However, they arrive at divergent con-
clusions. In his book Lectures on Principles 
of Political Obligation Green aims “to con-
sider the moral function or object served 
by law, or by the system of rights and obli-
gations which the state enforces, and in so 
doing to discover the true ground of justifi-
cation for obedience to law” (Green, 1999: 5). 
Green, therefore, aims to justify reasons for 
a political obligation of citizens. In his view, 
citizens will understand the obligation as a 
connection of interest and duty when they 
realize that a political obligation helps them 
in their self-perfection. In order to accom-
plish this end, the citizen has two capacities: 
the will to improve on the one hand, and 
reason on the other (Green, 1999: 7). The 
process of analysis is performed by means 
of the idea of what a society in which some 
individual lives should look like. What 
would then be the role of the state in the 
emancipation of those capacities of citizens? 
For Green (1999: 8), the function of law is 
to comprise citizens’ various conceptions of 
society and transform them into universal 
morality: “The value then of the institutions 
of civil life lies in their operation as giving 
reality to these capacities, as enabling them 
to be really exercised”.
The function of the state and laws is 
not a purely moral one. Due to the diver-
sity of conceptions of societal order that 
citizens have, the state sometimes needs 
to resort to repression. Therefore, political 
duty can at best be moral convention, but 
not genuine morality. The society needs yet 
to arrive at genuine morality by self-per-
fection through building laws and recog-
nizing rights. By relating laws and rights 
to the political, Green finds a justification 
for repression. According to him, the rea-
son for repression does not lie only in the 
pluralism of interests and conceptions, but 
in the need for the state to create the real 
equivalent of public good, i.e. “a system of 
rights and obligations [...] which may prop-
erly be called ‘natural,’ not in a sense in 
which the term ‘neutral’ would imply that 
such a system ever did exist or could exist 
independently of force exercised by society 
over individuals, but ‘neutral’ because nec-
essary to the end which it is the vocation of 
human society to realize” (Green, 1999: 9). 
Therefore, the political is closely connect-
ed to natural laws because natural rights 
are justified only to the extent to which the 
state is able to ensure political obligation 
(Green 1999: 16). It seems that Green’s theo-
ry of political obligation is based upon what 
Podunavac (2008: 172) terms “the organ-
ic ideal of a community” in whose basis is 
“the idea that the state is the main deposi-
tor of human freedom, rights and property”. 
Consequently, the principle of tolerance has 
limitation to its application and it can be 
revoked if it blocks further development of 
social life. In other words, for Green, liber-
alism itself has its limitations, so it becomes 
legitimate for the institutions of civil life 
to exercise illiberal measures in order to 
remove the barriers that stand in the way of 
citizens’ self-perfection. 
Green is at a constant risk that his the-
ory might be identified with dogmatism, 
where the conception of state is based on 
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Hobbesian absolutism, and where the state 
is the unconditional sovereign. In order to 
avoid this situation, Green had to transfer 
the justification of the role of institutions of 
public life from a political sphere to a meta-
physical one. He did this by introducing the 
general will of citizens into the discussion, 
through a qualitative definition of law: “It 
is more true to say that law, as a system of 
rules by which rights are maintained, is the 
expression of a general will than the gener-
al will is the sovereign (Green, 1999: 70).” It 
is clear from this that a general will is not a 
political, but a metaphysical category. Since 
the sovereignty of citizens and institutions 
of civil life is constituted through general 
will, it follows that laws, as an expression 
of a general will, are not political but met-
aphysical creations. The laws of civil socie-
ty are legitimate only when they express a 
general will for self-perfection of the society 
and citizens. 
If Green’s argumentation is under-
stood as a part of the history of liberal 
mainstream discourse, it is clear why Jean 
Hampton’s view is skeptical toward Rawls’s 
account that is in opposition to metaphys-
ical conceptions. In addition, the meta-
physical approach to liberalism is the basis 
of criticism coming from ethical liberals 
(Pavicevic 2011: 234), according to whom 
Rawls’s conception of public liberalism is 
morally imperfect, because it fails to admit 
that there are always certain values that 
liberalism should not tolerate in its scope. 
Ethical liberals reject the part of Green’s 
conception that justifies coercion, while at 
the same time giving additional arguments 
that liberalism possesses a morally superi-
or conception of good. Once citizens accept 
the liberal conception of good, they have 
no problem with justification why other 
political conceptions should be abandoned 
(Pavicevic, 2011: 241).
Finally, if Rawls’s conception is comple-
mented by a more or less superior concep-
tion of good, which would make liberalism 
more acceptable as a doctrine, it could still 
be criticized for its moral relativism. The 
problem lies at the foundation of theory, 
i.e. its value pluralism. As Strauss notably 
pointed out, pluralism is another name for 
relativism: for a liberal pluralist “every reso-
lute liberal hack or thug would be a civilized 
man, while Plato and Kant would be barbar-
ians” (Strauss, 1961: 140). In Rawls’s work, 
this issue is not reflected in a purely histor-
ical character of his theory, i.e. the process-
es of state, laws and society formation after 
the Reformation. Therefore, this is an issue 
of political culture. As Wolin (2004: 548) 
concludes, Rawls’s idea of common political 
culture aims to create “a citizen cult” of lib-
eralism, by making other traditions of polit-
ical thought and action relative. The critics 
accused Rawls of relating societal stabili-
ty to societies who are already liberal, i.e. 
where “citizens with liberal views constitute 
a stabile majority” (Pavicevic, 2011: 247). 
The question that can be drawn from this 
discussion is: can political culture be con-
ceptualized without involving metaphysics? 
LIBERALISM: CULTURAL, NOT 
METAPHYSICAL
In order to make the postulates of politi-
cal liberalism theory plausible, Rawls (1996: 
15) presupposes the existence of public, or 
political culture of constitutional democ-
racies: “This public culture comprises the 
political institutions of a constitutional 
regime and the public traditions of their 
interpretation (including those of the judici-
ary), as well as historic texts and documents 
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that are of common knowledge.” The foun-
dation of that constitutional culture is plu-
ralism which creates a political society “of 
diverse political communities and does not 
belong to any of them a priori” (Podunavac, 
2008: 155). The transcendental principle of 
a pluralistic society is the principle of toler-
ance. In other words, over the last half mil-
lennium the transcendental psychology of 
a pluralistic society has been such that cit-
izens’ behavior is guided by the idea that 
their fellow citizens sometimes have dif-
ferent, often disputable conceptions of the 
public good. 
Let me briefly summarize the critiques 
on Rawls’s account. By identifying the con-
tested nature of the public good in Political 
Liberalism, it is not difficult for one to infer 
that Rawls’s transcendental principle leads 
to value relativism. If each citizen is guided 
by the principle of tolerance, while there is 
no public criterion for its application, then 
we are not dealing with tolerance but rath-
er a Hobbesian conflict of incommensura-
ble ideals. There is no guarantee that the 
existence of a general cultural knowledge 
acquired through historical documents and 
court verdicts will make citizens believe 
that the preservation of order is of value 
in itself. Instead, it seems that an idealistic 
principle is necessary: in order to be toler-
ant toward different conceptions of societal 
order, the precondition is the minimal con-
sensus on what represents the right, moral 
or good conception of a society. The justi-
fication of that conception must go beyond 
the frame of legal norms and historical doc-
uments, i.e. it must be of metaphysical value 
itself.
I argue that this conclusion can be 
refuted by analyzing the concept of polit-
ical (public) culture that Rawls uses in his 
later writings, i.e. after A Theory of Justice. 
The introduction of political culture by 
Rawls is to reevaluate his concept of jus-
tice as one that should no longer “be devel-
oped sub specie aeteritatis, but as a theory 
which is derived and which addresses the 
public political culture of democratic soci-
eties” (Podunavac, 1998: 102). In Political 
Liberalism, political culture is defined as 
a set of basic ideas and principles (Rawls, 
1996). This definition is a summary of his 
idea from the paper “Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical”, in which one 
can find a very helpful definition of politi-
cal (public) culture, whose function lies in 
“specifying a point of view from which these 
principles can be seen” (Rawls 1985: 226). 
Public culture enables citizens to under-
stand why they should direct their interest 
toward the preservation of order. 
Rawls terms this kind of justification 
reasonableness and it presents a moral cri-
terion, or “the only normative criterion 
for determining the legitimacy of individ-
ual requests and beliefs” (Pavicevic, 2011: 
249). Using a visual metaphor, “reasonable-
ness” can be seen as the “smart glasses” of 
citizen rationality that enable the citizen to 
be guided by public principles when mak-
ing decisions by providing them insightful 
information regarding their fellow citizen. 
It is well known that reasonableness is not 
the same as rationality in Rawls’s conceptu-
al apparatus. Rationality represents a cogni-
tive dimension in the psychology of citizens, 
while reasonableness is related to the affec-
tive dimension, i.e. the citizen’s feelings 
about societal principles. For Rawls, prima-
ry affective loyalty of citizens within con-
stitutional political culture is related to the 
principle of tolerance.
By relating political (public) culture to 
the feelings of citizens, Rawls opted for the 
interpretation of a culture that is normal for 
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Western political science. It is important to 
stress that for Rawls (1996: 46) public cul-
ture is the way in which citizens see daily 
life and it represent the bridge between the 
abstract principles of political philosophy 
and real political conflicts in a society. This 
standpoint is not unusual in political cul-
ture studies. In similar terms, Verba (1965: 
515) defines political culture as the concept, 
which signifies citizens’ daily life sphere, 
meaning the way it functions in reality. In 
other words, the basis of political culture 
consists of “mentally conditioned habits and 
representations that comprise the predomi-
nantly non-reflective part of everyday life” 
(Podunavac, 1998: 233). An important con-
sequence of such definition of political cul-
ture is that it rests in the idea that political 
practices of citizens are equally general and 
based on empirical foundations. The politi-
cal culture of citizens means that there are 
multiple conceptions of good life, but that 
only some of them can constitute the basis 
of a just society. Which conceptions deserve 
to be included is not decided upon by phil-
osophical reflection, but results from the 
political agreement among citizens, which 
finds its basis is common experience: “We 
can regard these convictions as provision-
al fixed points which any conception of jus-
tice must account for it to be reasonable by 
us.” (Rawls 1985: 228). This lies at the heart 
of the seminal idea of overlapping consensus. 
Nevertheless, if overlapping consensus is 
used consistently with the term political 
culture in psychological terms, then this 
concept can be reduced to dispositional 
behavior.3 The reduction is legitimate, which 
can be seen from Rawls’s thesis on citizen 
3 Verba (1965: 516) believes that political culture is 
always related to dispositions as permanent forms of 
behavior, because the aim is to find out how citizens 
actually relate to political life, political goals and emo-
tional loyalty to the political system.
psychology: citizens are endowed with the 
ability to act rationally and reasonably; 
reasonableness and rationality are mutu-
ally irreducible and also inseparable. This 
means that it is impossible to turn rational-
ity into reasonableness (vice versa), and it is 
also impossible to practically separate these 
two principles. This is precisely the purpose 
of disposition. These are primitive concepts 
that cannot be reduced to something else. 
In spite of their irreducibility, one can iden-
tify certain elements within them (e.g. cog-
nitive, affective, and conative), but they are 
all descriptive in their nature.
At this point it is useful to recall Rawls’s 
application of the idea of descriptive theories, 
as a part of the semantics of A Theory of 
Justice (1971). Rawls relates the idea of good 
to rationality in A Theory of Justice, and in 
later works he reinforces this thesis by stat-
ing that there are numerous and incom-
mensurable conceptions of good. Their 
meaning is descriptive, which means that 
they are such conventionally, and that they 
do not need an additional meaning to be 
understood. However, the descriptive char-
acter of good as rationality cannot have 
primacy over the other two elements of 
behavior (affective and volitive), due to the 
nature of dispositional acting. This means 
that each normal4 citizen, when in the posi-
tion to make political decisions, strives 
to act in a balanced manner, which is the 
basic function of reasonableness. In other 
words, when it comes to making political 
decisions, citizens’ affective loyalty to the 
stability of political order leads to a bal-
anced position among various (conflicting) 
cognitive conceptions of good. Finally, the 
4 Under the term “normal citizen” I mean those cit-
izens who are not partisan representatives of various 
ideological, religious and other social options, which 
can influence the formation of political institutions 
and laws.
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volitive element of the disposition, which 
is no more than a principle of motivation,5 
supports the wish of the citizens to keep the 
stabile order, which is one of the most com-
plex civil activities.
Rawls’s conception of good has no met-
aphysical, but a prescriptive understand-
ing. This affects rationality in a twofold 
way: firstly, rationality does not allow for 
the claim that a certain way of life is more 
true or valuable than another6; secondly, 
rationality is the capacity to praise parts of 
the conceptions of others, which we consid-
er valuable. Finally, being a result of dispo-
sitional acting, the overlapping consensus 
ultimately depends on subjective factors, 
and not the objective ones, such as the abili-
ty to praise parts of others’ conceptions, the 
willingness to compromise in order to reach 
a consensus, and the motivation for such 
action, etc.
All these are elements of the principle of 
tolerance, but do they lead to value relativ-
ism? On the basis of the analysis provided so 
far, I claim the answer is negative for three 
reasons. Firstly, the nature of dispositional 
acting is such that even if its analysis were 
possible, it would not be possible to arrive 
at the metaphysical basis of action without 
regressing ad infinitum. Secondly, citizens’ 
action is most often such that it strives to 
preserve the stability of order, if such order 
is conventionally understood as the expres-
sion of justice as fairness. Conventionalism 
is not the same as value relativism. The con-
ventional nature of justice as fairness, which 
5 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) advocated the 
“Aristotelian theory of motivation” according to which 
people always strive to perfect those activities they do, 
ceteris paribus.
6 This is a consequence of Rawls’s claim on the 
incommensurability of values. When someone claims 
that a certain value has primacy over other values, 
they do not express philosophical truth, but perform 
doctrinal repression.
is a product of political culture, is political 
value in itself, but not moral value.7By refer-
ring to political culture, Rawls does not dis-
card the value of metaphysical justification 
of social order, but opts for another kind 
of value, equally legitimate in its form and 
normative in its content: justice as fairness 
is a political conception of justice, which 
is valuable in itself due to the convenient 
empirical circumstances that the action of 
citizens after the Reformation is regulated 
by the principle of tolerance. Thirdly, con-
ventionalism does not exclude moral justi-
fication due to the fact that it depends on 
citizens’ dispositional action. In order for 
behavior to be dispositional, it needs to be 
public, and reasonably acceptable as such. 
This is evident from Rawls’s requirement 
that all political action needs to pass a pub-
lic test in order to be legitimate. As Pavice-
vic (2011: 222) points out, the public test is 
“not expressed only through philosophical 
argumentation, but also through citizens’ 
general consensus”.
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON VALUE 
PLURALISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE
Since the Reformation, citizens of con-
stitutional democracies have lived in con-
venient empirical circumstances which 
have at least three characteristics: firstly, the 
everyday psychology of citizens is regulat-
ed by the transcendental principle of toler-
ance; secondly, the stability of order is a part 
of the political consensus based on a con-
ception of justice; thirdly, justification for 
such political consensus is a part of public 
morality, which is reflected in the willing-
ness of citizens to behave reasonably when 
7 It is not moral, due to the nature of its aim, which 
is to build stabile political institutions on just founda-
tions.
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pursuing their interests. The conception 
of citizenship psychology enables Rawls 
to bypass the metaphysical nature of law. 
To claim that laws are political categories 
means to claim that they are an institution-
al expression of citizens’ political culture, 
which is, if nothing else, a more elegant the-
ory based on humanistic principles, such as 
value pluralism.
This conclusion is important for the his-
tory of liberalism, because it comes from 
one of the most prominent exponents of lib-
eral political philosophy at the time when 
liberalism was regarded as a dominant 
metatheory and ideology. By introducing 
political (public) culture into his account, 
Rawls judiciously argued for value plural-
ism as a theoretical capacity to expand the 
notion of the liberal concept of tolerance. 
Therefore, the citizens of constitutional cul-
tures, in Rawls’s conception, have the capac-
ity to judge whether statements and actions 
are right or wrong, but the validity of those 
judgments is not based on metaphysical, but 
rather empirical, cultural validity. However, 
one cannot escape the feeling that Rawls’s 
conception of political culture is applicable 
only in a very specific spatial and historical 
context, namely to the European tradition 
of political philosophy and constitution-
al theory. This throws a shadow on Rawls’s 
attempts to reshape the tradition of Euro-
pean social liberalism, because it still has 
remnants of the old European notion of 
superiority of constitutional cultures over 
the rest of the political cultures. 
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Cilj ovog rada je da analizira Rolsovu koncepciju političke 
(javne) kulture, ispitujući da li njegovo načelo tolerancije 
(Politički liberalizam) zapada u moralni relativizam. Analiza 
se sastoji iz tri dela. Prvo, autor analizira različite kritičke 
pristupe Rolsovoj teoriji i pokazuje gde leži njihova greška. 
Drugo, autor razlučuje intelektualnu tradiciju socijalnog 
liberalizma iz koje je proizilazi Rolsova koncepcija, pokazujući 
da je on značajno primenio ključne ideje dominantne liberalne 
pravde Zapadnog sveta. U poslednjem delu rada nude se 
argumenti u prilog tezi da je Rolsova ideja političke kulture 
kamen temeljac pravednog društva i izvor tolerancije, čime 
se dodatno osnažuje ideja da Rolsova koncepcija političkog 
liberalizma ne zapada u moralni relativizam već je deo 
tradicije liberalnog pluralizma. 
OD METAFIZIČKOG DO POLITIČKOG:
Da li političkom kulturom Rolsov princip tolerancije zapada u moralni relativizam?
Originalni naučni radBojan Vranić
